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ABSTRACT
The Indiana Supreme Court recently upheld the nation’s most 
expansive school voucher program, once again propelling the 
national debate over the efficacy of both general education and 
special education voucher programs into the public spotlight. This 
decision marked a significant departure from a trend among state 
supreme courts in interpreting the legality of voucher programs 
under state constitutions’ establishment clauses, subsequently 
prompting concern from voucher opponents that this decision will 
herald a new wave of voucher-favorable litigation that will further 
divert state funds from public to private—mostly religious—
institutions. Several states have already proposed legislation to 
create or expand special education voucher programs following this 
decision. These proposed voucher programs provide millions of 
dollars in state funds to private schools, but the programs 
importantly lack basic accountability measures. 
While most general education voucher programs have several 
accountability measures written into the language of their respective 
state statutes, the majority of special education voucher programs 
have relatively few or no accountability measures in place. Given the 
increase in proposals for special education voucher programs that 
would effectively divert state funding to private schools during a 
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public-school funding crisis, states that propose legislation to 
introduce or expand special education voucher programs must be 
held accountable to ensure that use of the state’s funding for these 
programs objectively benefits the individualized needs of students 
with disabilities. The specific and mandatory participation standards 
for private schools should include the requirement that these schools 
retain certified special education instructors and provide annual 
individualized assessments of student progress administered by these 
instructors to both the students’ parents and to the state.
The undeniable future expansion of special education voucher 
programs necessitates the implementation of these proposed 
accountability measures. Requiring the inclusion of such 
accountability measures in the state statutes that authorize these 
programs will allow states to monitor the effectiveness of the 
programs, consequently allowing states to make well-informed 
decisions as to the expenditure of limited state funds and the 
implementation of new programs for students with disabilities. States 
currently proposing the creation or expansion of special education 
voucher programs must enact these proposed accountability 
measures now to prevent students with disabilities from receiving a 
subpar education and to prevent states from funding potentially 
ineffective educational programs during a public-school funding 
crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the nation’s most 
expansive school voucher program,1 subsequently reigniting the 
national debate over state-funded vouchers that allow both general 
education students and students with disabilities to attend private 
schools.2 The decision marked a significant departure from a trend in 
state supreme courts’ interpretations of school voucher programs 
under state constitutions’ establishment clauses,3 as several state high 
courts have previously struck down school voucher programs based 
on a constitutional provision called a “Blaine Amendment” that also 
appears in Indiana’s constitution.4 This constitutional provision 
prohibits the use of state money to fund private religious schools.5
The Indiana voucher program upheld in Meredith v. Pence is also 
unique because it is the first program to allow state funding of 
students’ private-school tuition for middle-income families as well as 
low-income families.6 Additionally, this voucher program has the 
potential to fund more than half of the schoolchildren in Indiana 
under the program’s broad eligibility requirements.7
                                                     
1.  Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1230-31 (Ind. 2013). 
2. See, e.g., Indiana School Voucher Program Enrollment More Than 
Doubled in Second Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/20/indiana-school-voucher-pr_n_ 
2166293.html; Indiana Supreme Court Upholds Nation’s Broadest School Voucher 
Program, WTHR.COM (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.wthr.com/ 
story/21795803/indiana-supreme-court-upholds-broadest-school-voucher-program; 
Peter Roff, Education Reformers Should Look to Indiana, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Apr. 1, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2013/ 
04/01/school-vouchers-inject-market-based-reform-into-schools. 
3. See Martha McCarthy, The Legal Status of School Vouchers: The Saga 
Continues, 297 EDUC. L. REP. 655, 656 (2013). 
4. See infra Subsection I.C.3 (emphasizing that state supreme courts have 
struck down school voucher programs based on language contained in the states’ 
respective constitutions that prohibits state governments from funding private 
religious schools). 
5. See infra Subsection I.C.4 (explaining that the Indiana Supreme Court 
upheld this school voucher program despite the existence of a Blaine Amendment 
within the state’s constitution that prohibited the government from using state
money to fund private schools, and emphasizing that the inclusion of this provision 
in states’ constitutions was one of the pivotal factors in state supreme courts’ earlier 
decisions to strike down the voucher programs). 
6. IND. CODE § 20-51-4-2.5 (2014); see also Scott Elliott, Indiana Could 
Be Top State for School Vouchers, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ibj.com/articles/49600-indiana-could-be-top-state-for-school-vouchers. 
7. See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1222-23 (Ind. 2013); 
McCarthy, supra note 3, at 665-66. 
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Therefore, the expansive nature of the Indiana program and the 
possibility that other state high courts will follow Indiana’s lead in 
upholding similar programs8 despite this constitutional provision9 has 
prompted concern for the future of public education,10 especially 
considering the current public-school funding crisis.11 In fact, several 
states have already proposed legislation to create or expand special 
education voucher programs following the Meredith v. Pence
decision.12 These proposals have sparked much controversy among 
voucher supporters and opponents.13 Moreover, a Florida judge 
                                                     
8. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 670 (“If the majority of the states adopt 
large-scale voucher programs to fund education and courts follow the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s lead in endorsing such programs, this could launch a new chapter 
in the voucher narrative.”).
9. See infra Subsection I.C.1 (providing a short history of the Blaine 
Amendments and emphasizing that forty out of fifty states currently have a Blaine 
provision in their respective state constitutions). 
10. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 670; see also Tex. Am. Fed’n of 
Teachers, Voucher Bill Encounters Strong Opposition in Texas Senate Committee 
Testimony, TEX. AFT (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.texasaft.org/voucher-bill-
encounters-strong-opposition-in-texas-senate-committee-testimony/ (discussing 
opposition to voucher programs based on concern for the future of public-school 
education, given that voucher programs divert state funds to pay the tuition of 
students attending private schools). 
11. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Florida Moves Toward School Voucher 
Expansion—But with No Accountability, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/03/18/florida-moves-
toward-school-voucher-expansion-but-with-no-accountability/ (“The money used to 
fund the [special education voucher] program would have gone to underfunded 
public schools, which are weakened by the diversion.[ ]It means our neighborhood 
public schools have less to offer students—teachers, sports, tutors, coaches, nurses, 
elective classes offered or materials they can afford for students.”); Kristi L. 
Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 895, 900 (2011) (stating that an “increasing number of school 
districts—sometimes major urban districts, often poorer districts, and perhaps 
especially rural districts that simply cannot raise local property taxes to survive the 
next few especially lean years—are nearing the point where they may not be able to 
pay their bills and at the same time fulfill what state law requires of them regarding 
class size, length of school day or year, curricular coverage, and other such 
regulations” (footnote omitted)). 
12. Florida proposed legislation to expand an existing special education 
voucher program in 2014. S.B. 850, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014). Wisconsin 
proposed legislation to create a new special education voucher program in 2013. 
S.B. 525, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013). 
13. See, e.g., Kathleen McGrory, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Signs Voucher 
Expansion, Collegiate High Schools into Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 20, 2014, 
1:06 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/gradebook/florida-gov-rick-scott-signs-
voucher-expansion-collegiate-high-schools/2185280; Erin Richards, New Voucher 
Plan for Special-Needs Students Revives Dispute, J. SENTINEL (Jan. 20, 2014), 
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recently dismissed challenges to a new special education voucher 
program14 that provides $18 million in state funds for students with 
disabilities15 and yet does not require educators at participating 
private schools to hold special education credentials16 or to provide 
student progress reports to the state.17
While most general education voucher programs have several 
accountability measures written into the language of their respective 
state statutes,18 the majority of special education voucher programs 
have relatively few or no accountability measures in place.19 There is 
currently a void in legal scholarship detailing ways in which newly 
proposed state-funded special education voucher programs might 
mandate more stringent accountability requirements for participating 
private schools.20 Given the increase in proposals for special 
education voucher programs21 that would effectively divert state 
funding to private schools during a public-school funding crisis,22
states that propose legislation to introduce or expand special 
education voucher programs must be held accountable to ensure that 
use of the state’s funding for these programs objectively benefits the 
individualized needs of students with disabilities.23
This Note not only addresses the issue of private-school 
accountability, but also proposes ways in which this problem should 
                                                                                                               
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/gop-legislators-to-revive-proposed-
vouchers-for-special-needs-students-b99187865z1-241190261.html. 
14. See Kathleen McGrory, Judge Dismisses Florida School Voucher 
Lawsuit, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://www.miamiherald. 
com/news/local/education/article2233578.html. 
15. See McGrory, supra note 13. 
16. See Strauss, supra note 11. 
17. See id. 
18. See School Voucher Laws: State-By-State Comparison, NCSL, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/voucher-law-comparison.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2015). Most general education voucher programs require that participating 
private schools administer state assessments to voucher recipients and implement 
teacher evaluations. Id. 
19. See infra Part II (categorizing current special education school voucher 
laws into three groups: programs with no state accountability measures in place, 
programs with one accountability measure in place, and programs with more than 
one accountability measure in place). 
20. See infra Part III (providing a concrete solution that would increase 
accountability for participating private schools based on two specifically articulated 
accountability measures). 
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing several sources 
that discuss the current public-school funding crisis). 
23. See infra Part III. 
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be remedied by outlining specific and mandatory participation 
standards for private schools.24 Those private schools wishing to 
participate in special education voucher programs must (1) retain 
certified special education instructors;25 and (2) provide annual 
individualized assessments of student progress administered by these 
certified special education instructors to both the students’ parents 
and to the state.26 These proposed requirements should apply to both 
parochial and secular private schools participating in special 
education voucher programs.27 Requiring accountability for newly 
proposed state-funded special education voucher programs serves the 
dual purpose of ensuring that state dollars are spent in an objectively 
beneficial way and guaranteeing that students with disabilities who 
attend private schools receive a high standard of education.28
Part I defines special education voucher programs and 
discusses the policy debate regarding these programs.29 Part I also 
examines the current national status of state-funded school voucher 
programs and provides a brief legal history detailing the 
constitutional challenges to these programs at both the federal and 
state level.30 Part II outlines accountability measures for general 
education voucher programs and then categorizes current special 
education school voucher laws into three groups: programs with no 
state accountability measures in place, programs with one 
accountability measure in place, and programs with more than one 
accountability measure in place.31 Finally, Part III acknowledges the 
potential for significant increases in special education voucher 
programs and proposes a solution to the accountability predicament 
by outlining specific and mandatory participation standards for 
private schools that would provide a practicable and effective way to 
ensure accountability.32
                                                     
24. See infra Section III.B (outlining two basic accountability requirements 
that all newly proposed special education voucher programs should implement). 
25. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
26. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
27. See infra Part III. While both parochial and secular private schools 
participate in school voucher programs, most voucher litigation stems from states’ 
funding of parochial private schools. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra Sections III.B-C.
29. See infra Part I. 
30. See infra Part I. 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. See infra Part III.
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I. SPECIAL EDUCATION VOUCHERS: POLICY DEBATE AND LEGAL 
HISTORY 
Special education voucher programs allow parents to receive 
state funds that will enable them to send their child with disabilities 
to a private school.33 While voucher proponents advocate for parents’
ability to choose the requisite educational institution for their child 
with disabilities,34 voucher opponents cite a number of problems with 
these voucher programs, focusing on the diversion of funds from 
public schools,35 the lack of accountability measures for these 
programs,36 and the fact that the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) already provides an effective avenue through 
which parents may attain private placement for their child.37 Despite 
this opposition, special education voucher programs have survived 
Establishment Clause challenges on both the federal and state level,38
which has led to an increase in proposals for implementing these 
programs,39 thus illustrating the need to mandate more stringent 
accountability measures.40
A. Defining Special Education Voucher Programs 
The debate over school voucher programs stems from the 
transfer of students and state funds from public to private—mostly 
religious—schools.41 The National Conference of State Legislatures 
                                                     
33. See infra Sections I.A-B (defining special education voucher programs 
and providing statistics to illustrate the differences between public and private 
schools regarding students’ rights under the IDEA).
34. See infra Section I.A (explaining the reasons for which voucher 
supporters consider special education vouchers an ideal way for parents to remove 
students with disabilities from the public-school system without resorting to 
potentially undesirable IDEA procedural requirements). 
35. See infra Section I.A (presenting several arguments that voucher 
opponents commonly bring forth with regard to special education vouchers, the most 
common being that these programs divert much-needed funds from public-school 
systems). 
36. See infra Part II (dividing the ten existing special education voucher 
programs into three groups based on the presence or absence of accountability 
measures in each program’s authorizing state statute). 
37. See infra Subsection I.B.2 (outlining special education voucher 
opponents’ two main criticisms stemming from IDEA provisions).
38. See infra Section I.C. 
39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra Part III. 
41. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (providing percentages for the 
number of sectarian and nonsectarian private schools). 
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defines school vouchers as “state-funded scholarships that pay for 
students to attend private school rather than public school.”42 As a 
subset of school voucher programs, special education voucher 
programs provide state funds to parents of students with disabilities 
in order to pay for those students’ private-school tuition.43 As for the 
number of students enrolled in public and private schools, 86% of 
children in the United States attend public schools while 11% of 
children attend private schools.44 Three percent (3%) of students are 
homeschooled.45 Additionally, 77% of these private schools are 
sectarian institutions while 23% are nonsectarian.46 As for students 
enrolled in voucher programs, the number of participants steadily 
increases each year, with record numbers of enrollment for the 2013–
2014 school year.47 More than 308,000 students nationwide 
participated in private-school choice programs during the 2013–2014 
school year, with a total of 115,580 students participating in voucher 
programs.48 Of these 115,580 students, 36,424 students with 
disabilities were enrolled in ten special education voucher 
programs,49 and the total amount of money expended in the 2013–
                                                     
42. School Vouchers, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/ 
school-choice-vouchers.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
43. See infra Part II (categorizing and describing the ten special education 
voucher programs currently in place). 
44. Percentage Distribution of Students Ages 5 Through 17 Attending 
Kindergarten Through 12th Grade, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (2010), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_041.asp.
45. Id. 
46. INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. & U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012 (NCES 2012-045), at 139 (2012), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf. 
47. Betsy Devos, Kansas Becomes 19th School Choice State, 40th 
Program, AM. FED’N FOR CHILDREN (Apr. 22, 2014, 9:33 AM), http:// 
www.federationforchildren.org/kansas-becomes-19th-school-choice-state-40th-
program/ (stating that “[t]he [2013–2014] school year produced the largest single 
year increase in school choice enrollment nationwide”).
48. Facts, AM. FED’N FOR CHILDREN, ED CHOICE 101, http://www. 
federationforchildren.org/ed-choice-101/facts/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). Of the 
308,000 students, 115,580 students participated in voucher programs, 192,219 
students participated in scholarship tax-credit programs, and 761 students 
participated in education savings-account programs. Id. 
49. MATT FRENDEWEY ET AL., SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK 2013–2014, at 15
(2014), http://allianceforschoolchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/AFC_2013-
14_Yearbook.pdf?58ca27. This number is the sum of each program’s total number 
of participating students, but does not include data from Mississippi’s Speech-
Language Therapy Scholarship Program or North Carolina’s Children with 
Disabilities Scholarship Grants because these two programs began in 2013, and 
therefore no data is yet available for these programs. Id. 
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2014 school year for these special education voucher programs was 
$275 million.50 Given the steady increase in special education 
voucher programs and the millions of dollars expended each year on 
these programs, it is unsurprising that proponents and opponents 
engage in a heated debate regarding the efficacy of special education 
vouchers.51
Proponents of these programs argue that parental choice is 
critical in determining the best placement for a student with 
disabilities.52 Both the United States Supreme Court and state high 
courts have also justified these programs due to the importance of 
parental choice,53 though this choice is both uninformed and 
potentially detrimental for special education students.54 Supporters of 
special education voucher programs also argue that these programs 
provide increased opportunities for placement based on the 
individualized needs of a student with disabilities.55 Finally, 
proponents emphasize that special education voucher programs are 
an effective way to avoid costly, time-consuming, and emotionally 
harrowing litigation procedures under the IDEA when parents wish 
to challenge the effectiveness of their student’s education.56
On the other hand, voucher opponents bring forth several 
critiques of these programs.57 Voucher opponents argue that the use 
of state money to fund private schools violates state constitutional 
provisions due to the fact that many of these programs divert state 
                                                     
50. See id. at 13. 
51. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
52. See Jay P. Greene & Stuart Buck, The Case for Special Education 
Vouchers, 10 EDUC. NEXT 37, 41 (2010) (“The empirical research shows that when 
parents are empowered with vouchers, they are actually more likely to obtain 
necessary services.”).
53. See infra Subsections I.C.2-4.
54. See infra Part III. 
55. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 39 (stating that “one can 
anticipate an inexorable growth in the size and popularity of these programs” once 
parents realize that the programs provide increased opportunities for students with 
disabilities). 
56. See id. (“But unlike the procedures established under IDEA, school-
voucher laws give parents the right to select a private placement without having to 
convince public school officials of the need for such services, to say nothing of the 
legal costs of proving to a hearing officer, or a state court judge, that the decision of 
the school district was in error.”).
57. See id. (“In addition to legal challenges, opponents of special education 
vouchers are beginning to advance political and educational arguments against the 
idea as new programs are being considered in states such as Texas, Pennsylvania, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina, and the existing Ohio program is poised to 
expand.”).
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funds to private religious schools.58 Opponents further criticize the 
lack of accountability for participating private schools due to the 
absence of standardized testing procedures for students with 
disabilities59 and to the fact that participating private schools do not 
require that certified special education teachers implement the 
special education programs.60 Finally, opponents bring forth two 
arguments specifically related to students’ rights already in place 
under the IDEA, thus asserting that there is no need for special 
education voucher programs that divert funding from public schools 
to private institutions.61 However, despite these criticisms of special 
education voucher programs, the number of voucher participants 
steadily increases each year.62 Additionally, several proposals for 
new programs or expansion of existing programs have recently 
emerged.63 Thus, notwithstanding these concerns regarding the 
existing voucher programs, voucher proponents currently appear to 
control this debate.64
B. Special Education Voucher Programs and the IDEA 
Since the availability and efficacy of the IDEA provisions 
constitute prominent points of contention on both sides of the debate 
regarding school voucher programs,65 it is first necessary to 
understand the general framework of this federal law66 before 
outlining voucher opponents’ two main arguments concerning 
                                                     
58. See infra Subsection I.C.3 (examining state high courts’ decisions 
regarding constitutional challenges to school voucher programs). 
59. See, e.g., Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 42 (addressing the National 
Education Association’s concerns regarding the lack of state assessment 
administration to students with disabilities enrolled in voucher programs). 
60. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (consolidating data on whether the ten 
existing special education voucher programs require that instructors at the 
participating private schools have special education credentials). 
61. See infra Subsection I.B.2 (analyzing the two arguments that school 
vouchers are unnecessary because the IDEA is an avenue through which students 
with disabilities have a right to private placement, and that utilizing special 
education vouchers requires that parents waive rights and procedural protections 
under the IDEA). 
62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra Section III.A (showing an increase in recent proposals for the 
creation or expansion of special education voucher programs and charting the yearly 
increase in students with disabilities who enroll in these programs). 
65. See infra Subsections I.B.1-2.
66. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
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students’ rights under the IDEA.67 Given that thousands of students 
with disabilities enroll in special education voucher programs that 
cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars each year,68 opponents 
cite the IDEA provisions already in place to show that these funds 
are wastefully spent.69 On the other hand, proponents expound the 
necessity of this expense due to insurmountable problems with these 
IDEA provisions.70
1. Public v. Private Schools: Students’ Rights Under the IDEA
Under federal law, students with disabilities receive 
educational rights through the IDEA.71 The IDEA contains four main 
provisions: (1) every child has a right to a Free and Appropriate 
Public Education (FAPE),72 which can occur in either a public or 
private setting;73 (2) the school district must design an Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP) for each child with a disability74 and must 
design this IEP in consultation with the child’s parents;75 (3) the 
child’s education should occur in the “[l]east restrictive 
environment”;76 and (4) parents can challenge the adequacy of the 
                                                     
67. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
68. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
70. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
71. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012). For a discussion of the IDEA as well 
as private placement of students under state special education laws, see Stuart Buck, 
Special Education Vouchers are Beneficial: A Response to Hensel, 41 J.L. & EDUC.
651, 653 (2012). Students with disabilities are also protected under § 504, which 
prevents schools from discriminating against students with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 
794(a) (2012) (mandating that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
73. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with 
disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, 
are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is 
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
74. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (outlining the requirements for developing and 
reviewing a student’s IEP).
75. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i).
76. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
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child’s education by requesting a due process hearing77 with an 
independent hearing officer.78 Parents have the right to appeal the 
decisions of the independent hearing officer to state educational 
agencies79 and then may appeal again to the state or federal district 
courts.80
As an alternative to these IDEA procedural remedies, state 
statutes that authorize special education voucher programs allow 
students with active IEPs who are currently enrolled in public 
schools to use the state’s funds in order to attend private schools.81
Therefore, parents may remove their child from a public school 
without going through the process of challenging the adequacy of the 
child’s education through the IDEA procedures and with the 
assurance that the state will pay for the child’s private-school tuition 
through the voucher program.82 However, there are few or no 
accountability measures in place for ensuring that a student’s IEP is 
carried out effectively once the parent elects to enroll the student in a 
voucher program and sends the student to a private school, which is 
one of the main criticisms of these voucher programs.83
                                                     
77. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (mandating that “the parents or the local educational 
agency involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due 
process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the 
local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational
agency”).
78. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (stating that the hearing officer cannot have 
any connection to the state or local governmental entities that oversee the child’s
education and cannot have any conflicts of interest). 
79. Id. § 1415(g)(1) (stating that “any party aggrieved by the findings and 
decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the 
State educational agency”).
80. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing that an aggrieved party “shall have the 
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this 
section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or 
in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in 
controversy”).
81. See Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The 
Future of Special Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 292 (2010) (“Over the last 
several years, an increasing number of state legislatures have actively entered this 
arena [of reforming special education laws], proposing or passing laws that give 
children with disabilities public money to attend a private school.”).
82. See Buck, supra note 71, at 655 (“IDEA private placements are much 
more restrictive than special education vouchers, which are available at the parents’
wishes without the further need to seek anyone else’s permission.”).
83. See infra Part II (categorizing the ten special education voucher 
programs currently in place based on the presence or absence of accountability 
measures). 
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2. Criticisms of Special Education Voucher Programs 
Stemming from IDEA Provisions 
Voucher opponents further outline two criticisms of special 
education vouchers that specifically pertain to IDEA provisions: (1) 
school vouchers are unnecessary because the IDEA is an avenue 
through which students with disabilities have a right to private 
placement;84 and (2) utilizing special education vouchers requires 
parents to waive rights and procedural protections under the IDEA.85
As a response to the first main criticism, the complex procedures 
involved under the IDEA to obtain a private placement raise several 
issues as to the effective placement of students with disabilities.86 For 
instance, there is a low probability that parents will win the case, as 
school districts win a majority of IDEA challenges.87
Additionally, the expense,88 the time,89 and—most 
importantly—the psychological and emotional toll on the child and 
the child’s family involved in litigation procedures makes legal 
challenges through the IDEA not only undesirable, but altogether 
impracticable for most parents.90 Even if the parents do manage to 
win a legal challenge in order to obtain a private placement, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that parents prevailing in the 
IDEA challenge are responsible for paying expert fees.91 One such 
                                                     
84. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 39-40.
85. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 330 (“In exchange for securing a set 
amount for private schooling, students with disabilities waive their right to seek full 
tuition and fees when school districts fail to meet their obligations under the 
IDEA.”).
86. See Buck, supra note 71, at 654-55. 
87. See Marcus A. Winters, The Promise of Special Education Vouchers, 9 
NAT’L AFF. 146, 153 (2011) (“[W]hen school districts challenge orders to pay for a 
disabled child’s education at a private school, they usually win: According to 
research by Thomas Mayes and Perry Zirkel, school districts in fact triumph in about 
63% of such cases.”).
88. See id. (emphasizing that “[m]any parents are unfamiliar with the legal 
process and can’t afford legal counsel; they are thus at a disadvantage when suing 
deep-pocketed school districts and their teams of lawyers”).
89. See id. at 154 (“Perhaps the biggest disadvantage faced by parents who 
would sue for private placement is time. Court challenges to a child’s IEP can take 
months and sometimes years to complete. During that time, the child remains in a 
public school that his parents believe is not meeting his needs. Delay doesn’t harm 
the school district, but it can be detrimental to a growing child.”).
90. See Buck, supra note 71, at 655. 
91. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
304 (2006) (holding that parents who prevailed in obtaining tuition reimbursement 
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legal challenge to the adequacy of a student’s IEP lasted over seven 
years and cost the student’s parents $29,350 for the expert’s services 
in the IDEA challenge.92 Furthermore, the system in place under the 
IDEA creates an adversarial system in which parents and educators 
work against as opposed to in coordination with each other.93 Thus, 
opponents argue that the IDEA may not actually be a desirable 
avenue through which to challenge the effectiveness of a student’s
education.94
The second main criticism of special education voucher 
programs specifically regarding the IDEA is the fact that a parent 
must waive the rights and procedural protections under the IDEA in 
order to utilize special education vouchers.95 Additionally, although 
Section 504’s antidiscrimination mandate applies to both secular and 
religious schools that receive federal funding, those private schools 
that participate in voucher programs are not included within this 
coverage when financed exclusively through state funds.96 In 
response to these criticisms, voucher supporters point out that these 
legal rights under the IDEA are not irreversibly waived: Should 
parents decide that private placement does not work for their student, 
returning to the public-school system effectively and effortlessly 
reestablishes all of the child’s rights under the IDEA.97
Moreover, all parents who decide to send their children to 
private schools—whether through a voucher program or not—
                                                                                                               
for their son’s private placement under the IDEA still had to pay tens of thousands 
of dollars for an expert’s services in the litigation). 
92. Id. at 294, 304; see also Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 38. 
93. See Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Reality over Ideology: A Practical View 
of Special Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53, 93 (2014) (“The special 
education system currently set up by the IDEA is, in essence, an adversarial system 
that pits parents and educators at opposite ends of a negotiating table with separate 
goals.”).
94. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
95. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 330 (“The problematic absence of 
meaningful accountability measures is exacerbated by the waiver of legal rights 
required in order for students with disabilities to participate in special needs 
vouchers programs.”).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (mandating that “[n]o otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance”). For a detailed discussion of Section 504 as it pertains to religious 
schools that receive federal funding, see Lynn M. Daggett, “Minor Adjustments” 
and Other Not-So-Minor Obligations: Section 504, Private Religious K-12 Schools, 
and Students with Disabilities, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 301 (2014). 
97. See Buck, supra note 71, at 659. 
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inevitably waive the ability to utilize public-school resources, but 
this does not mean that those resources will not be available should 
the student transfer to a public school.98 Therefore, proponents argue 
that vouchers offer another more practicable option for parents of 
students with disabilities, an option that does not require that the 
parents resort to litigation should their student’s educational needs 
fail to be met.99 Proponents again emphasize that the IDEA’s
procedural protections may not be desirable because they can be 
costly, time-consuming, and emotionally draining for both the 
student and the student’s family.100 Moreover, these procedural 
“protections” may actually serve as barriers: While the exhaustion 
requirement exists to ensure that parents and schools make a serious 
effort to reconcile differences without the aid of the court system,101
the IDEA’s procedural requirement that parents first exhaust 
administrative remedies in certain situations may lead to a court’s
outright rejection of parents’ legal claims.102
Despite these criticisms, however, special education voucher 
programs continue to grow in both the number of programs and the 
number of participants each scholastic year.103 The growth in these 
programs means that increased numbers of students with disabilities 
will unwittingly forfeit their rights under the IDEA.104 This not only 
places these students at a significant disadvantage, but also destroys 
the “parental choice” aspect that courts tout as the defining 
justification for these programs because parents do not realize that 
                                                     
98. See id. at 659-60. 
99. See id. at 658-60 (stating that “without vouchers, the only thing that 
could be done is to pursue an expensive and time-consuming legal process; with 
vouchers, the parents would have the option of finding better services somewhere 
else or returning to the traditional public school” (footnote omitted)). 
100. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
101. See Peter J. Maher, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ 
Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by 
Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by 
the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259, 265-66 (2011). 
102. See Kent Sparks, Comment, Requiring Administrative Exhaustion While 
the School Shuts Down: An Insurmountable Barrier to Seeking IDEA Enforcement,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2014) (“[P]arents seeking to temporarily 
prevent a school from closing due to an alleged IDEA violation face an 
insurmountable obstacle by being required to first exhaust the administrative 
remedies.”).
103. See infra Section III.A (outlining recent proposals for the creation or 
expansion of special education voucher programs and charting the steady increase in 
students with disabilities who enroll in these programs each year). 
104. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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they are forfeiting their child’s IDEA protections by enrolling their 
child in a voucher program.105 This trend illustrates the need for more 
stringent accountability requirements for special education voucher 
programs,106 especially since these programs also continue to survive 
challenges on both the federal and state level.107
C. Surmounting Federal and State Constitutional Challenges 
Outlining the policy debate regarding school vouchers makes 
clear the reasons for which opponents challenge these vouchers on 
both the federal and state level.108 When presented with a challenge 
to the legality of a school voucher program, the United States 
Supreme Court held that such a program does not violate the 
Establishment Clause,109 thus allowing states to provide voucher 
programs but not requiring states to do so.110 Therefore, the legality 
of these programs fell to the states and state courts’ interpretation of 
their respective constitutional provisions.111 State high courts 
predominantly struck down school voucher programs due to Blaine 
Amendments contained in states’ constitutions that prevent the state 
government from funding private religious schools.112 However, the 
recent Meredith v. Pence decision marks a departure in this trend, 
given that the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a voucher program 
despite the fact that Indiana’s constitution also contains this Blaine 
provision.113 Contemporary voucher litigation predominantly 
comprises these arguments that voucher programs violate the 
Establishment Clause or violate Blaine Amendments found in state 
constitutions.114
                                                     
105. See infra Section I.C. 
106. See infra Part III (outlining two proposed requirements for current and 
future special education voucher programs). 
107. See infra Section I.C. 
108. See supra Section I.B. 
109. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). 
110. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 659-60.
111. See id. (“Most challenges to voucher programs under state constitutions 
have alleged violations of: (a) provisions barring the use of public funds for 
religious purposes, (b) provisions prohibiting compelled support of religious 
institutions, and/or (c) education clauses placing a duty on the legislature to provide 
for a uniform system of education in the state.”).
112. See infra Subsection I.C.3. 
113. See infra Subsection I.C.4. 
114. See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
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1. The Establishment Clause and the Waning Influence of the 
Blaine Amendments 
Voucher opponents contest school voucher programs by 
bringing forth arguments that these programs violate the 
Establishment Clause115 as well as violate Blaine Amendments in 
states’ constitutions.116 The Establishment Clause broadly guarantees 
the separation of church and state.117 Forty states118 currently have 
Blaine provisions in their constitutions that prohibit the state 
government from providing money to private religious schools.119
Therefore, though the Establishment Clause may not bar a voucher 
program, the program may violate a state’s Blaine provision.120 These 
Blaine provisions originally began as a proposed amendment to the 
                                                     
115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
118. The following is a list of the forty states and their respective Blaine 
provisions: (1) ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263; (2) ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; 
(3) ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; id. art. IX, § 10; (4) ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; 
(5) CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 8, 9(f); id. art. XVI, § 5; (6) COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; 
(7) DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; (8) FLA. CONST. art I, § 3; (9) GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, 
para. 7; (10) HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; (11) IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §§ 5, 6; (12) ILL.
CONST. art. X, § 3; (13) IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; (14) KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; 
(15) KY. CONST. § 189; (16) MASS. CONST. amends. XVIII, XLVIII; (17) MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. VIII, § 2; (18) MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; (19) MISS.
CONST. art. IV, § 66; id. art. VIII, § 208; (20) MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. IX, § 8; 
(21) MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; (22) NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; (23) NEV.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 9, 10; (24) N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII; (25) N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § 3; id. art. XXI, § 4; (26) N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; (27) N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5; (28) OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; (29) OKLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 5; id. art. II, § 5; id. art. XI, § 5; (30) OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; (31) PA. CONST. art. 
III, §§ 15, 29; (32) S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; (33) S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; id. art. 
VIII, § 16; id. art. XXII, § 4; (34) TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. VII, § 5(c); 
(35) UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. III, § 4; id. art. X, §§ 1, 9; (36) VA. CONST. art. 
IV, § 16; id. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11; (37) WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; id. art. IX, 
§ 4; id. art. XXVI, § 4; (38) W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; (39) WIS. CONST. art. I, 
§ 18; id. art. X, §§ 3, 6; (40) WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19; id. art. III, § 36; id. art. VII, 
§ 8; id. art. XXI, § 28. 
119. See generally Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the 
Blaine Amendments and Their Modern Application, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 111, 115 (2011) (providing a history of the Blaine 
Amendments and analyzing recent constitutional challenges to Blaine Amendments 
in school voucher cases). 
120. See id. 
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federal Constitution121 that ultimately failed.122 Maine Congressman 
James Blaine introduced a National Blaine Amendment on 
December 14, 1875.123 Blaine proposed this amendment to prohibit 
the federal government from providing funds to Catholic schools124
in hopes of securing the 1876 presidential nomination.125 While this 
amendment ultimately failed on the federal level, fourteen states 
immediately adopted some form of the Blaine Amendment to 
prevent the use of state funds to support religious schools,126 and 
today forty states have various forms of the Blaine Amendment in 
their state constitutions.127
Some voucher opponents believe that the Blaine provisions 
serve as the “most prominent weapon” for prohibiting the transfer of 
state funds to private schools.128 However, scholars suggest that the 
Blaine Amendments no longer serve any significant purpose in 
deterring states from providing funds to private-school programs,129
and the Meredith v. Pence decision appears to support this 
contention.130 The Blaine Amendments are especially significant due 
to a United States Supreme Court decision that upheld the legality of 
voucher programs on the federal level.131
                                                     
121. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State 
Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 551, 556 (2003). 
122. See id. at 573 (describing how the vote in the Senate lacked the 
necessary two-thirds majority for adoption of the proposed Blaine Amendment on 
the federal level). 
123. See id. at 556. 
124. See Clint Bolick, The Constitutional Parameters of School Choice,
2008 BYU L. REV. 335, 342 (2008). 
125. See DeForrest, supra note 121, at 557. 
126. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First 
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 673 
(1998). 
127. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the 
Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School 
Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 414 (2003).
129. See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment,
2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 298 (2008) (stating that “the Blaine Amendment is 
relatively insignificant—both as a constitutional event and as a tool for analyzing the 
no-funding amendments contained in the various state constitutions.”); see also
Katz, supra note 119, at 115 (emphasizing that “[d]espite a number of recent 
constitutional challenges to the Blaine Amendments, most courts have attempted not 
to decide the issue, likely not wanting to call into question the constitutional 
provisions in forty states, many of which are well over one hundred years old”).
130. See infra Subsection I.C.4. 
131. See infra Subsection I.C.2. 
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2. Federal Consideration of School Voucher Programs  
School voucher programs survived a federal constitutional 
challenge in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.132 While this case was not 
specific to special education vouchers, opponents challenged both 
general education and special education vouchers using the same 
arguments because state funds paid the private-school tuition of 
students in both programs.133 In Zelman, Cleveland’s voucher 
program allowed low-income students to use public funds for 
private—mostly religious—schools.134 The Supreme Court held that 
the school voucher program did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.135
The Court stated that the challenged program was one of “true 
private choice” in that it gives funds to parents, who may then 
choose where to send their children.136 Because the funds did not go 
directly to private religious schools, but to parents, the Court stated 
that the voucher program and the benefits it conferred to private 
schools were “neutral in all respects toward religion.”137 The Court 
thus placed a heavy emphasis on parental choice as the defining 
justification for the voucher program.138 This 5–4 decision generated 
a heated debate, particularly because over 96% of the families chose 
                                                     
132. 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). 
133. See generally McCarthy, supra note 3 (outlining the legal challenges to 
school voucher programs regardless of the program’s designation as a special 
education or general education voucher program). 
134. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (stating that forty-six of the fifty-six 
private schools that participated in this school voucher program were religious 
institutions). 
135. See id. at 662-63 (“[The voucher program] permits . . . individuals to 
exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. 
The program is therefore a program of true private choice. In keeping with an 
unbroken line of decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the 
program does not offend the Establishment Clause.”).
136. See id. at 653 (“We believe that the program challenged here is a 
program of true private choice, consistent with Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and 
thus constitutional.”).
137. See id. (emphasizing that the challenged school voucher program allows 
for the participation of both sectarian and nonsectarian schools and stating that 
public schools may actually benefit financially if they choose to participate). 
138. See id. at 652 (“Because the program ensured that parents were the ones 
to select a religious school as the best learning environment for their handicapped 
child, the circuit between government and religion was broken, and the 
Establishment Clause was not implicated.”).  
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to use the state funding for religious schools.139 In sum, given that 
Zelman upheld voucher programs on the federal level, the legality of 
voucher programs has been largely left to the states, subject to state 
high courts’ interpretations of their respective constitutional 
provisions.140
3. State Consideration of School Voucher Programs  
Though the United States Supreme Court upheld school 
voucher programs on the federal level, state high courts have 
predominantly held that these programs violate state constitutional 
provisions that prohibit the use of state funds for private schools.141
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down a school voucher 
program that allowed tuition reimbursement to sectarian schools.142
The Blaine provision in Vermont’s constitution provides that “no 
person ought to, or of right can be compelled to . . . support any 
place of worship . . . contrary to the dictates of conscience.”143 The 
Vermont Supreme Court struck down the voucher program due to 
this Blaine provision because the voucher program “authorize[d] 
tuition reimbursement to sectarian schools without appropriate 
restrictions.”144 Similarly, in 2004, a Florida court struck down a 
voucher program145 due to a constitutional provision that prohibits 
state aid for private education.146 The court stated that the voucher 
program violated this Blaine provision because the program provided 
                                                     
139. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 658. But see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 659 
(“The 96% figure . . . discounts entirely (1) the more than 1,900 Cleveland children 
enrolled in alternative community schools, (2) the more than 13,000 children 
enrolled in alternative magnet schools, and (3) the more than 1,400 children enrolled 
in traditional public schools with tutorial assistance.”).
140. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 659-60.
141. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
142. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 563-
64 (Vt. 1999). 
143. See id. at 549 (quoting VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III). 
144. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist., 738 A.2d at 564. 
145. See Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(en banc). 
146. See id. at 352 (“The constitutional prohibition in the no-aid provision 
involves three elements: (1) the prohibited state action must involve the use of state 
tax revenues; (2) the prohibited use of state revenues is broadly defined, in that state 
revenues cannot be used ‘directly or indirectly in aid of’ the prohibited beneficiaries; 
and (3) the prohibited beneficiaries of the use of state revenues are ‘any church, sect 
or religious denomination’ or ‘any sectarian institution.’”).
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state funds to religious schools.147 In 2009, the Arizona Supreme 
Court struck down a special education school voucher program based 
on a similar Blaine provision found in Arizona’s constitution.148 The 
provision stated that “[n]o tax shall be laid or appropriation of public 
money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or 
any public service corporation.”149 While the Arizona Supreme Court 
recognized the merit in the program, the Court emphasized that the 
language of the state constitution prohibited such funding of 
religious schools.150 However, despite these state high-court 
decisions, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a voucher program in 
Meredith v. Pence notwithstanding the Blaine provision in Indiana’s
constitution—effectively sparking a potential new direction for 
voucher litigation at the state level.151
4.  Meredith v. Pence: A New Direction 
Despite the number of state high courts that have struck down 
voucher programs, the Indiana Supreme Court in Meredith v. Pence
changed course by upholding a school voucher program 
notwithstanding the inclusion of a Blaine Amendment provision in 
the state’s constitution.152 The voucher program at issue in Meredith 
v. Pence distributed funds called “choice scholarships” that allowed 
students who fit the eligibility requirements to enroll in private 
schools—including religious private schools—instead of public 
schools.153 Unsurprisingly, given the high percentage of private 
                                                     
147. See id. at 366. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated this 
program on other grounds, thus avoiding the separation of church and state issue. 
See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412-13 (Fla. 2006) (stating that the voucher 
program violated another provision regarding the “uniformity” requirements for 
Florida public schools and emphasizing that “[w]hat is in the Constitution always 
must prevail over emotion” (quoting Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 336 (Fla. 
2004))). 
148. See Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1185 (Ariz. 2009). 
149. See id. at 1180 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10).
150. Cain, 202 P.3d at 1185 (emphasizing that while “[t]he voucher 
programs appear to be a well-intentioned effort to assist two distinct student 
populations with special needs,” the Arizona Supreme Court is “bound by our 
Constitution . . . [that] does not permit appropriations of public money to private and 
sectarian schools”).
151. See infra Subsection I.C.4. 
152. See 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1230-31 (Ind. 2013). 
153. See id. at 1217 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 3). 
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schools that are sectarian,154 the majority of private schools that have 
participated in this program are religious institutions.155
The opponents of the Indiana school voucher program brought 
three challenges, all of them familiar challenges that voucher 
opponents had brought in previous cases before other state courts.156
The first challenge contested the use of state funds for private-school 
education instead of use of those funds for the general and uniform 
system of common schools that is proscribed by the state’s
constitution.157 The Court quoted the challenged language of 
Indiana’s constitution: 
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, 
being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the 
duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, 
intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by 
law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein 
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.158  
With regard to this challenge, the Indiana Supreme Court determined 
that the education clause proscribed two separate legislative duties: 
the first duty being “to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, 
intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement,”159 and the 
second duty being “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform 
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, 
and equally open to all.”160 The Court ultimately held that the word 
“and” meant that these two duties were separate because “[t]he 
framers use of the conjunction ‘and’ plainly suggests that the phrases 
are separate and distinct,”161 and thus the second duty “is not 
implicated by the school voucher program.”162 In sum, the Court held 
that the contested education clause contained two separate 
educational duties, which allowed the Court to uphold the voucher 
program that provided funds to private schools.163
The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision regarding this provision 
is in direct opposition to the Louisiana Supreme Court and the 
                                                     
154. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
155. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1220 (stating that “most of the schools . . . 
were religiously affiliated”).
156. See supra Subsection I.C.3. 
157. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1220. 
158. See id. at 1221 (quoting IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). 
159. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1221.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1225. 
163. See id. at 1224-25. 
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Florida Supreme Court’s respective decisions.164 In fact, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court had quickly rejected the same argument 
regarding the separate educational duties that the Indiana Supreme 
Court accepted in Meredith v. Pence.165 Similarly, the Florida 
Supreme Court also held that the duty to provide a uniform system of 
public education also encompassed the state’s duty to ensure 
adequate provision for all students’ education in the state.166
However, despite Louisiana and Florida’s interpretations, the Indiana 
Supreme Court decided to consider these separate duties.167
Therefore, the first challenge to the Indiana school voucher program 
failed based on the Indiana Supreme Court’s close reading of a 
conjunction within the constitutional provision that allowed the state 
to provide funding for students to attend private schools.168
The Court in Meredith v. Pence also held that the voucher 
program did not abridge the state constitutional provision that “no
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of 
worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent”169 because 
this clause was not meant to limit government expenditures.170 Even 
though the Court recognized that other state supreme courts had 
come to the opposite conclusion regarding very similar provisions in 
their respective state constitutions, the Indiana Supreme Court 
expressed disagreement with those decisions.171 Instead, the Court 
held that the challenged voucher program did not violate the state’s
constitutional prohibition on the compelled support of religion.172
Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court also held that the state’s
constitutional provision that barred states from allocating funds “for 
the benefit of any religious or theological institution” did not render 
the school voucher program unconstitutional.173 The Court instead 
                                                     
164. See La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 118 So. 3d 1033, 1051 (La. 2013) 
(holding that the state’s education clause did not create separate educational duties); 
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 406-07 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the state’s 
education clause mandated that the state provide a uniform system of public 
education, a duty that is not separate from the duty to ensure adequate provision for 
students’ education).
165. See La. Fed’n of Teachers, 118 So. 3d at 1051. 
166. See Bush, 919 So. 2d at 406-07.
167. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1224-25.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1225 (quoting IND. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
170. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1226. 
171. See id. at 1226 n.20 (citing Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 622-23
(Wis. 1998)). 
172. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1226 n.20.  
173. See id. at 1227 (quoting IND. CONST. art. I, § 6). 
 Accountability in Special Education Voucher Programs 1149 
compared the voucher program to money that private institutions 
receive from fire department and police department services to show 
that the framers did not intend to prohibit all funding that may 
benefit private institutions.174 However, the wording of Indiana’s
constitutional provision does not differ substantially from other 
states’ constitutional provisions that have caused state courts to strike 
down these voucher programs, suggesting that these Blaine 
provisions may not hold the same force in 2013 as they did in the 
early 2000s.175
Additionally, the Indiana Supreme Court specifically
distinguished the voucher program at issue with private-school dual-
enrollment programs that provide an unconstitutional advantage 
because private-school students may enroll in more costly courses in 
public schools.176 While private schools receive a benefit from this 
dual-enrollment program, the Court stated that the voucher program 
does not actually provide money directly to private religious 
schools.177 Rather, the voucher program provides the money to 
families of students, whose parents then choose to place the student 
in a private school: “The voucher program does not directly fund 
religious activities because no funds may be dispersed 
to any program-eligible school without the private, independent 
selection by the parents of a program-eligible student.”178 Therefore, 
the Indiana Supreme Court applied the same reasoning that the 
United States Supreme Court applied in the Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris case—that indirect funding of private schools through 
parental choice does not violate the state’s constitutional 
                                                     
174. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1227 (“We first find it inconceivable that 
the framers and ratifiers intended to expansively prohibit any and all government 
expenditures from which a religious or theological institution derives a benefit—for 
example, fire and police protection, municipal water and sewage service, sidewalks 
and streets, and the like. Certainly religious or theological institutions may derive 
relatively substantial benefits from such municipal services. But the primary 
beneficiary is the public, both the public affiliated with the religious or theological 
institution, and the general public. Any benefit to religious or theological institutions 
in the above examples, though potentially substantial, is ancillary and indirect.”).
175. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 669. 
176. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1227 (citing Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 
N.E.2d 157, 160-67 (Ind. 2003) (plurality opinion)). 
177. See Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1229. 
178. See id.
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provision179—as opposed to the reasoning of several other state 
supreme courts.180
Since the three challenges to the Indiana voucher program were 
so similar to challenges that caused numerous state supreme courts to 
strike down these programs based on similarly worded Blaine 
provisions,181 a debate arose as to whether state high courts will 
follow the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision and uphold these 
voucher programs despite their own Blaine provisions.182 While 
Meredith v. Pence may appear to be an outlier at first glance, this 
decision may encourage other state high courts to uphold school 
voucher programs despite similar Blaine provisions found in their 
respective state constitutions.183 Professor Martha McCarthy 
expresses concern regarding this novel interpretation of state 
education clauses and its potential effect on other state high courts, 
emphasizing that the Indiana decision is likely to “signal a new wave 
of state litigation with outcomes more favorable to voucher 
programs.”184 The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision may provide the 
impetus for other state supreme courts to likewise weaken the 
influence of their states’ respective Blaine Amendments.185
Therefore, the likelihood that new voucher litigation may result in 
more voucher-favorable outcomes highlights the necessity of 
urgently implementing more stringent accountability measures for 
participating private schools.186
While proponents of special education voucher programs extol 
the importance of parental choice in determining the appropriate 
school for a child with disabilities,187 opponents believe that these 
programs violate state establishment clauses as well as deplete 
                                                     
179. See supra Subsection I.C.2 (showing the emphasis that the United 
States Supreme Court placed on parental choice as the defining justification for 
upholding the legality of school voucher programs on the federal level). 
180. See supra Subsection I.C.3. 
181. See supra Subsection I.C.3. 
182. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 670. 
183. See, e.g., id.; Bolick, supra note 124, at 344-45.
184. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 669 (“By offering a new slant on 
interpreting state education clauses and rejecting all challenges to the Indiana 
voucher program, the Indiana high court has provided encouragement to school 
privatization proponents that this ruling could become a prototype for other state 
court decisions. If this happens, it could signal a new wave of state litigation with 
outcomes more favorable to voucher programs.”).
185. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
186. See infra Part III. 
187. See supra Section I.A (providing a discussion of the policy debate 
regarding special education voucher programs). 
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funding for public schools.188 There is considerable disagreement 
regarding whether the IDEA provides an adequate and even feasible 
avenue through which parents may challenge the educational 
services that their child receives.189 While voucher opponents believe 
that the system in place under the IDEA is practicable,190 voucher 
supporters highlight the difficulties inherent in following the IDEA 
procedural requirements.191 As for legal action, voucher opponents 
have challenged school voucher programs on both the state and 
federal level, predominantly arguing that these programs violate 
constitutional provisions.192 However, given the Meredith v. Pence
decision and the subsequent increase in proposals for special 
education voucher programs,193 the likelihood that the states’
respective Blaine provisions will not provide a bar for these 
programs indicates the need to mandate objective accountability 
measures for participating private schools.194 Thus, categorizing 
current special education voucher programs based on their respective 
levels of state accountability helps to elucidate this need for more 
stringent accountability requirements.195
II. CATEGORIZING AND ASSESSING SPECIAL EDUCATION VOUCHER 
PROGRAMS BASED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE LEVELS OF STATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY
Though several critics have addressed flaws in school voucher 
programs and have challenged the legality of these programs at both 
                                                     
188. See supra Section I.A. 
189. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (outlining two main criticisms of special 
education voucher programs stemming from IDEA provisions). 
190. See supra Section I.B.2. 
191. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 39-40 (“Given the low 
probability of victory as well as the considerable time, expense, and psychological 
discomfort involved in waging a legal battle, it isn’t surprising that private 
placements are rare, especially among families who lack the wealth and 
sophistication required to navigate the legal system successfully.”).
192. See supra Subsections I.C.2-3 (discussing constitutional challenges to 
school voucher programs on both the federal and state level). 
193. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (indicating that Florida and 
Wisconsin are examples of two states that have proposed expansion or creation of 
special education voucher programs). 
194. See infra Part III. 
195. See infra Part II (dividing the ten current special education voucher 
programs into three categories: programs with no state accountability measures, 
programs with one state accountability measure, and programs with more than one 
state accountability measure). 
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the federal and state level,196 there is one criticism that remains 
untouched: private-school accountability.197 There are currently ten 
state-funded special education voucher programs in place across the 
United States,198 the majority of which contain no state assessment 
requirements or adequate teacher certification requirements for 
ensuring that state funds actually benefit the individualized needs of 
students with disabilities.199 While legal scholars have pointed out 
these issues, no one has yet proposed a definitive solution or outlined 
specific steps toward reaching a solution to this particular problem.200
Therefore, examining the statutory language that authorizes these 
special education voucher programs and categorizing the programs 
based on the presence of accountability measures—or the complete 
lack thereof—is the first step toward proposing a solution.201 The ten 
special education voucher programs currently in place can be 
categorized into three groups based on their respective levels of 
accountability: programs with no state accountability measures,202
programs with one accountability measure,203 and programs with 
more than one accountability measure.204
A. Special Education Voucher Programs with No State 
Accountability Measures  
Though the majority of general education voucher programs 
require that the participating private school administer state 
                                                     
196. See supra Section I.C. 
197. See infra Sections II.A-C (categorizing special education voucher 
programs based on the presence or absence of accountability measures to illustrate 
the lack of private-school accountability). 
198. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
199. See infra Sections II.A-C.
200. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 328 (stating that “[t]his absence of 
accountability is certain to leave at least some children with disabilities worse off 
upon exiting from public school”); see also James G. Dwyer, No Accounting for 
School Vouchers, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 386 (2013) (“What, if anything, do 
states require of the private schools they subsidize by way of education? With 
several existing voucher programs, the answer is straightforward: ‘nothing.’”).
201. See infra Sections II.A-C.
202. See infra Section II.A (outlining the five special education voucher 
programs currently in place with no state accountability measures). 
203. See infra Section II.B (outlining the two special education voucher 
programs currently in place with one state accountability measure). 
204. See infra Section II.C (outlining the three special education voucher 
programs currently in place with more than one state accountability measure). 
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assessments and report data on student progress to the state,205 the 
majority of special education voucher programs lack this basic 
accountability measure.206 General education voucher programs 
include accountability measures such as required annual standardized 
testing, public reporting of student results, and independent 
evaluations of instructors.207 The School Choice Yearbook charts 
these three basic accountability measures for all voucher programs.208
When visually compared to general education voucher programs in a 
chart with these three accountability measures, the lack of 
accountability for special education voucher programs is glaringly 
and grievously obvious: Almost every special education voucher 
program is missing all three of those basic requirements.209
Additionally, federal legislation such as the IDEA requires that 
educators in non-voucher settings are “highly qualified,”210 meaning 
that these educators must have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree 
and receive certification as a special education instructor or 
successfully complete the state’s special education licensing exam.211
In contrast, the majority of these special education voucher programs 
do not even require that the participating private school maintain a 
single educator with special education credentials on staff.212 There 
are currently five special education voucher programs that lack the 
two basic accountability measures of requiring that participating 
private schools retain educators with special education credentials 
and requiring that the schools report student progress to the state.213
                                                     
205. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
206. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
207. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 98 (charting the presence of 
accountability measures in school voucher programs). 
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(D) (2012) (“[A] State shall adopt a policy that 
includes a requirement that local educational agencies in the State take measurable 
steps to recruit, hire, train, and retain highly qualified personnel to provide special 
education and related services under this subchapter to children with disabilities.”).
211. Id. § 7801(23) (defining the term “highly qualified” with respect to 
current elementary and secondary teachers as well as teachers who are new to the 
profession). 
212. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
213. Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities 
Program, Utah’s Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship Program, Georgia’s 
Special Needs Scholarship Program, Oklahoma’s Lindsay Nicole Henry Scholarship 
for Students with Disabilities Program, and North Carolina’s Children with 
Disabilities Scholarship Grant. See infra Subsections II.A.1-5.
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1. Florida: John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with 
Disabilities Program 
Florida was the first state in the nation to offer state-funded 
school vouchers exclusively to students with disabilities.214 In the 
2013–2014 school year, 27,040 students received vouchers215 that 
totaled an expenditure of $168,890,916 in state funds.216 This 
voucher program allows students the option to attend a private 
school by providing a scholarship to pay for the students’ tuition.217
As for teacher certification requirements, the statute provides that 
special education instructors in the participating private school must 
have a baccalaureate degree and three years of teaching experience 
“or have special skills, knowledge, or expertise that qualifies them to 
provide instruction in subjects taught,”218 though the statute has no 
specific requirement that instructors hold special education 
certifications.219 There is also no requirement that private schools 
provide assessments of student progress to the state, though the 
school must cooperate with parents in the event that a parent would 
like the child to take part in state standardized testing.220
In addition to the lack of required special education 
certification and the absence of a requirement for providing the state 
with annual assessments of student progress, schools that participate 
in the McKay Scholarship program also fail to provide parents with 
information about the program when parents ask for that 
information.221 When surveyed, “50% of parents of public special 
                                                     
214. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
215. See id.
216. See id. 
217. FLA. STAT. § 1002.39(1) (2014) (offering tuition scholarships for 
students with “an intellectual disability; a speech impairment; a language 
impairment; a hearing impairment, including deafness; a visual impairment, 
including blindness; a dual sensory impairment; an orthopedic impairment; an other 
health impairment; an emotional or behavioral disability; a specific learning 
disability, including, but not limited to, dyslexia, dyscalculia, or developmental 
aphasia; a traumatic brain injury; a developmental delay; or autism spectrum 
disorder”).
218. Id. § 1002.421(2)(h). 
219. Id. (stating that teachers must “have special skills, knowledge, or 
expertise,” but providing no specific requirement that teachers are certified in 
special education instruction). 
220. Id. § 1002.39(5)(f), (8)(c)(2). 
221. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 322 (“Some states . . . do not require 
private schools participating in special needs vouchers to inform parents of the 
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education students in the study’s survey reported that they ‘were not 
able to get the information they had wanted,’ particularly on the 
subjects of ‘quality of teachers, academic quality, and special 
education programs.’”222 Another study “found that 77% of the 
schools accepting McKay students provided no special program of 
any kind for disabled students.”223 Thus, parents often lack 
information about these voucher programs and cannot easily obtain 
this information.224
2. Utah: Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship Program 
Utah’s special education voucher program began in 2005.225 In 
the 2013–2014 school year, 650 students received vouchers226 that 
totaled an expenditure of $3,892,000 in state funds.227 This program 
offers scholarship money to a student with disabilities in order for 
the student to attend a private school that has registered with the 
state.228 Like the Florida special education voucher program, Utah’s
program is also offered to students with a broad range of 
disabilities.229 The program further requires that special education 
instructors have either a baccalaureate degree;230 at least three years 
of prior teaching experience;231 or “the necessary special skills, 
knowledge, or expertise,” but does not specifically require that 
special education instructors hold any particular special education 
credentials.232 While participating private schools must assess each 
                                                                                                               
individualized instruction and services that will be provided to their child upon 
matriculation.”).
222. See id. at 323 (footnote omitted). 
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
226. See id.
227. See id. 
228. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-704(2) (West 2014) (outlining the 
qualifications for students with disabilities). 
229. Id. § 53A-1a-704(2)(b)(i)-(xi) (offering scholarships for students with 
“(i) an intellectual disability; (ii) a hearing impairment; (iii) a speech or language 
impairment; (iv) a visual impairment; (v) a serious emotional disturbance; (vi) an 
orthopedic impairment; (vii) autism; (viii) traumatic brain injury; (ix) other health 
impairment; (x) specific learning disabilities; or (xi) a developmental delay, 
provided the student is at least five years of age . . . and is younger than eight years 
of age”).  
230. Id. § 53A-1a-705(1)(g)(i). 
231. Id. § 53A-1a-705(1)(g)(ii). 
232. Id. § 53A-1a-705(1)(g)(iii). 
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student’s progress annually,233 the statute only requires that the 
students’ parents receive reports of this information; there is no 
requirement that this information be reported to the state.234
3. Georgia: Special Needs Scholarship Program 
Georgia’s Special Needs Scholarship Program began in 2007235
and allows students wishing to participate in this voucher program to 
attend either another public school236 or a private school.237 In the 
2013–2014 school year, 3,400 students received vouchers238 that 
totaled an expenditure of $13,649,039 in state funds.239 This program 
also offers scholarships to students with a number of disabilities, 
ranging from Autism to visual impairment.240 As far as educational 
requirements for special education instructors, teachers must have a 
baccalaureate degree or “have at least three years of experience in 
education or health,” though the degree and years of experience are 
not specific to teaching special education.241 There is no requirement 
that the participating private school report the students’ progress to 
the state, but the statute does require that the school annually provide 
the students’ parents with the teachers’ credentials.242
4. Oklahoma: Lindsay Nicole Henry Scholarship for Students 
with Disabilities Program 
In 2010, Oklahoma enacted a special education voucher 
program to serve students with disabilities.243 In the 2013–2014 
school year, 290 students received vouchers244 that totaled an 
                                                     
233. Id. § 53A-1a-705(1)(f)(i). 
234. Id. § 53A-1a-705(1)(f)(ii). 
235. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
236. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2113(b)(1)-(2) (2014). 
237. Id. § 20-2-2113(b)(4). 
238. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15.  
239. See id.
240. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2114(a)(2) (offering scholarship funds to 
students with the following disabilities: “(A) Autism; (B) Deaf/blind; (C) Deaf/hard 
of hearing; (D) Emotional and behavioral disorder; (E) Intellectual disability; (F) 
Orthopedic impairment; (G) Other health impairment; (H) Specific learning 
disability; (I) Speech-language impairment; (J) Traumatic brain injury; or (K) Visual 
impairment”).
241. Id. § 20-2-2115(a)(7). 
242. Id.
243. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
244. See id. 
 Accountability in Special Education Voucher Programs 1157 
expenditure of $1,312,773 in state funds.245 This program offers state 
funds to students with disabilities who already have an IEP on file in 
order for the student to attend a private school.246 Teachers must hold 
a baccalaureate degree, but even this is not necessary if the instructor 
has at least three years of experience or has acquired “special skills, 
knowledge or expertise.”247 Thus, there is no requirement in this 
statute that teachers have any special education credentials, and there 
is no definition of what these lesser qualifications might entail.248
Furthermore, while the statute requires that the participating private 
school send student progress reports to the student’s parents,249 the 
statute does not require that the school send this information to the 
state.250
5. North Carolina: Children with Disabilities Scholarship 
Grant 
In 2013, North Carolina implemented the Children with 
Disabilities Scholarship Grant for students with disabilities.251 There 
is currently no data to report on this scholarship program regarding 
student enrollment or funds expended in the 2013–2014 school year 
because this program began in 2013.252 Eligible students must require 
an IEP and daily special education services, but the statute does not 
require that teachers hold special education credentials.253
Additionally, although the participating private schools must report 
student progress to parents upon request in fulfillment of IDEA 
requirements, no such requirement appears in the statute for 
reporting student progress to the state.254 While these five special 
education voucher programs with no accountability measures 
comprise half of the special education voucher programs currently in 
                                                     
245. See id.
246. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101.2(A) (2014). 
247. Id. § 13-101.2(H)(6). 
248. See Wendy F. Hensel, Recent Developments in Voucher Programs for 
Students with Disabilities, 59 LOY. L. REV. 323, 329 (2013). 
249. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101.2(H)(5). 
250. See id. (stating that participating private schools must send student 
progress reports to parents, but providing no requirement that states also receive 
reports of student progress). 
251. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
252. See id. 
253. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-112.5(2) (2014) (outlining the criteria for 
eligible students). 
254. Id. § 115C-112.9. 
1158 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1125 
place across the United States, there are currently two programs that 
contain one accountability measure.255
B. Special Education Voucher Programs with One State 
Accountability Measure  
Two of the ten existing special education voucher programs 
contain one state accountability measure for ensuring that students 
with disabilities receive an adequate education.256 Mississippi’s two 
programs tailored to students with specific disabilities each contain 
one accountability measure: The two programs require that the 
instructors at the participating private schools hold licenses or 
certifications to teach students with those disabilities.257 These 
certifications work as an effective accountability measure for 
ensuring that students with disabilities receive the appropriate 
education.258
Mississippi’s special education voucher program for students 
with dyslexia, the Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy Scholarship for 
Students with Dyslexia Program, began in 2012.259 In the 2013–2014 
school year, seventy-three students received vouchers260 that totaled 
an expenditure of $330,681 in state funds.261 To be eligible to attend 
a “public or state accredited nonpublic special purpose school that 
provides . . . comprehensive dyslexia therapy instruction,”262 students 
must be diagnosed with dyslexia and in first through sixth grade.263
The statute also contains a provision that requires specific licensing 
and certification requirements for instructors.264 Instructors must be 
licensed in dyslexia therapy or supervised by a licensed dyslexia 
                                                     
255. See infra Section II.B. 
256. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-173-21(2), 175-1(f) (2014). 
257. Id. § 173-21(2), 175-1-(f).
258. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
259. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-173-1(g) (2014). 
263. Id. § 37-173-1(f). 
264. Id. § 37-173-21(2) (“The qualified personnel to facilitate the 
educational process of learning and instruction for children with dyslexia who attend 
the schools shall consist of the following: (a) An administrator or director with 
additional training in the characteristics of dyslexia; (b) A dyslexia therapist licensed 
by the department in dyslexia therapy; (c) Dyslexia therapists in training 
participating in a department approved dyslexia therapy graduate internship 
program; and (d) Licensed elementary teachers under the supervision of a state 
department licensed dyslexia therapist.”).
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therapist from the state department.265 However, while participating 
private schools must provide annual student progress reports to the 
student’s parents, there is no requirement that these progress reports 
also be shared with the state.266
In 2013, Mississippi implemented another special education 
voucher program for a specific group of students with disabilities, 
the Mississippi Speech-Language Therapy Scholarship for Students 
With Speech-Language Impairments Program.267 As this program 
began in 2013, there is currently no data available on the number of 
students who received vouchers or the amount of money the state 
expended on this program.268 Eligible students must be in 
kindergarten through sixth grade and have “an eligibility ruling of 
speech-language impairment.”269 Much like Mississippi’s Dyslexia 
Therapy Scholarship, this program also requires that educators of 
voucher recipients hold specific certification credentials in that the 
instructors must be speech-language pathologists.270 Additionally, 
though the school must provide annual written reports of student 
progress to parents, the statute does not require that the school send 
these reports to the state.271 While Mississippi’s two special 
education voucher programs contain one accountability measure—
specific licensing and certification requirements for special education 
instructors—only three programs contain more than one 
accountability measure.272
C. Special Education Voucher Programs with More Than One State 
Accountability Measure
Three of the ten existing special education voucher programs 
contain more than one accountability measure: one voucher program 
in Louisiana273 and two in Ohio.274 These programs contain 
                                                     
265. Id.
266. Id. § 37-173-17(1)(c) (stating that the participating private school must 
“[b]e academically accountable to the parent or legal guardian for meeting the 
educational needs of the student by, at a minimum, annually providing to the parent 
or legal guardian a written explanation of the student’s progress”).
267. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
268. See id.
269. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-175-3 (2014). 
270. Id. § 37-175-21(2). 
271. Id. § 37-175-17(1)(c). 
272. See infra Section II.C (outlining the three special education voucher 
programs that have more than one accountability measure in place). 
273. See infra Subsection II.C.1. 
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accountability measures such as required special education 
certification for special education instructors and required reporting 
of student progress to the state.275 Thus, these programs provide the 
state with objective criteria through which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the voucher programs.276
1. Louisiana: School Choice Program for Certain Students 
with Exceptionalities 
Louisiana enacted its special education school voucher 
program in 2010.277 In the 2013–2014 school year, 245 students 
received vouchers278 that totaled an expenditure of $534,898 in state 
funds.279 In order to receive funds for private schooling, students 
must “be in need of services for autism, a mental disability, 
emotional disturbance, developmental delay, other health 
impairment, specific learning disability, or traumatic brain injury”280
and have an IEP on file.281 In 2014, the Louisiana legislature 
amended this provision to include that the student may either have an 
IEP “or a plan that is created by the nonpublic school that the student 
will attend and that clearly identifies the services provided by the 
school and specifies how those services adequately address the 
student’s needs.”282 Furthermore, the statute requires that 
participating schools must have provided special education services 
for at least two years.283 The statute also specifically requires that a 
participating school employ “teachers holding appropriate 
certification in special education” such that it matches the special 
education credentials required of public school instructors.284
However, while the statute requires that schools report the number of 
                                                                                                               
274. See infra Subsections II.C.2-3.
275. See infra Subsections II.C.1-3.
276. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of mandating objective 
accountability measures to ensure that students with disabilities receive a quality 
education and to ensure that state funds are spent wisely). 
277. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:4031(B)(2)(a) (2014). 
281. Id. 
282. Act of May 28, 2014, No. 272, § 17:4031(B)(2)(a), 2014 La. Sess. Law 
Serv. 1-2 (West). 
283. LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:4031(D)(1)(c). 
284. Id.  
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students enrolled in the program to the state, the statute does not 
require that schools report student progress to the state.285
2. Ohio: Autism Scholarship Program 
In 2003, Ohio implemented its Autism Scholarship voucher 
program.286 In the 2013–2014 school year, 2,623 students received 
vouchers287 that totaled an expenditure of $46,970,000 in state 
funds.288 Eligible voucher recipients must be diagnosed with 
Autism289 and have an IEP on file in order to receive state funds.290
This program requires that the participating private school 
implement the student’s IEP that the school district developed.291 The 
school district “is responsible for initiating and conducting meetings 
to develop, review and revise the IEP of a child with a disability at 
least annually.”292 Participating private schools must also provide 
quarterly student progress reports to both parents and to the state 
regarding the student’s progress toward the outlined IEP goals.293
Additionally, parents do not have to waive the students’ rights under 
the IDEA in order to participate in the program.294
3. Ohio: Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program 
In 2011, Ohio passed a broader special education voucher 
program.295 In the 2013–2014 school year, 2,103 students received 
vouchers296 that totaled an expenditure of $26,110,226 in state 
                                                     
285. Id. § 17:4031(E)(1)-(2). 
286. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.41(A)(7)(a) (West 2014). 
290. Id. § 3310.41(A)(7)(b). 
291. Id. § 3310.41(B).
292. See OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., AUTISM SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM GUIDELINES 
15 (2010–2011), https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Special-
Education/Federal-and-State-Requirements/Procedures-and-Guidance/ 
Individualized-Education-Program-IEP/Individualized-Education-Program/ASP-
Guidelines-1.pdf. 
293. See id. at 16 (“These reports should indicate the child’s progress toward 
the annual goals and the extent to which that progress is sufficient for the child to 
achieve the goals by the end of the year.”).  
294. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 305. 
295. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15. 
296. See id. 
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funds.297 This program allows any student with an IEP on file, 
including students diagnosed with Autism, to receive state funds to 
attend a private school.298 However, students with Autism may not 
receive scholarships under both Ohio programs.299 As for teacher 
credentials, participating private schools must employ instructors 
who “hold credentials determined by the state board to be 
appropriate for the qualified special education children enrolled in 
the special education program it operates.”300 This program is notably 
the only special education voucher program that requires 
administration of state assessments, which are conducted by the 
student’s IEP team.301 Finally, this program requires that participating 
private schools provide reports of the students’ progress to the state 
as well as keep track of the implementation of the students’ IEPs.302
Categorizing these special education voucher programs based 
on the presence or absence of accountability measures illustrates that 
the majority of these programs lack accountability.303 This near-
complete absence of accountability measures is glaring when 
compared to the numerous accountability measures employed in 
general education voucher programs.304 Given that an increasing 
number of students enroll in voucher programs each year305 and the 
fact that these programs cost each state millions of dollars each 
year,306 newly proposed special education voucher programs 
should—at the very least—require two specific accountability 
                                                     
297. See id. 
298. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.51(F) (West 2014) (defining eligibility 
requirements for students wishing to receive the scholarship, including age 
requirements, the definition of a child with a disability, and particular requirements 
pertaining to the implementation of a student’s IEP).
299. Id. § 3310.51(F)(5). 
300. Id. § 3310.58(C).
301. Id. § 3310.522.
302. Id. § 3310.58(G) (“The school or entity agrees to provide a record of the 
implementation of the individualized education program for each qualified special 
education child enrolled in the school’s or entity’s special education program, 
including evaluation of the child’s progress, to the school district in which the child 
is entitled to attend school, in the form and manner prescribed by the department.”).
303. See supra Sections II.A-B.
304. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (describing general 
education voucher program accountability measures, such as required teacher 
qualifications and required standardized testing that is reported to the state). 
305. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 17 (charting the increase in 
the total number of students enrolled in voucher programs from the 2000–2001 
school year to the 2013–2014 school year). 
306. See id. at 15. 
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measures to ensure that students receive a quality education and that 
these programs constitute an effective use of state funds.307 First, 
participating private schools must have certified special education 
instructors on staff;308 second, participating private schools must 
provide annual reports of student progress to the state.309
III. OUTLINING SPECIFIC AND MANDATORY PARTICIPATION 
STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY
Establishment Clause challenges to voucher programs on both 
the federal and state level illustrate the intensity of this policy debate 
over special education voucher programs.310 Scholars tend to outline 
the policy reasons in support of or in opposition to these voucher 
programs,311 but provide relatively few concrete suggestions that 
would increase accountability for those private schools participating 
in special education voucher programs.312 One reason for this may be 
that the traditional measures of accountability for general education 
students313 are not the best measures for students with disabilities 
because each student with a disability has individualized goals based 
on the student’s IEP.314 However, there are practicable ways to 
                                                     
307. See infra Section III.B. 
308. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
309. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
310. See supra Section I.C. 
311. See supra Section I.B (describing the arguments of school voucher 
proponents and opponents as well as identifying criticisms of special education 
voucher programs that specifically pertain to existing IDEA procedures). 
312. See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Providing Special 
Education Services to Students in Religious Schools, 219 EDUC. L. REP. 347, 365 
(2007) (“Even when [IDEA] funds are used to provide services for parentally-placed 
children in private schools, the accountability for the funds and the services 
provided remains with the states and the public school districts.”).
313. Standardized state tests are the traditional measures of accountability 
for general education voucher programs. See Dwyer, supra note 200, at 389 (stating 
that “[a] significant number of states require that students participating in a [general 
education] voucher program take some of the same standardized tests that public 
school students take and report the results to the state education agency or to 
parents”).
314. See, e.g., Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 42 (“It might be best, 
however, not to require state accountability testing in a special education voucher 
program. With the difficulties disabled students face and the highly varied goals and 
criteria for success that may be appropriate for each student, state accountability 
testing is not always helpful in assessing the academic progress of individual special 
education students. Educational goals and assessments often need to be customized 
to individual circumstances.”).
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measure accountability for special education voucher programs.315
State statutes that authorize special education voucher programs 
should require that participating private schools (1) retain certified 
special education instructors;316 and (2) provide annual individualized 
assessments of student progress administered by those certified 
special education instructors to both the students’ parents and to the 
state.317 Therefore, newly proposed special education voucher 
programs should follow Louisiana and Ohio’s lead in mandating 
more stringent accountability requirements for participating private 
schools to ensure that state funds are objectively benefiting the needs 
of students with disabilities and that state funds are allocated to 
effective educational programs.318
A. Future Increases in Special Education Voucher Programs 
The need to define objective accountability measures for 
special education voucher programs is apparent when considering 
the increases in proposals for the creation or expansion of these 
programs.319 The recent Meredith v. Pence decision thrust school 
voucher programs into the public spotlight,320 consequently leading 
to proposals for the creation or expansion of voucher programs in 
several states.321 Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court in Meredith
upheld a voucher program322 despite the inclusion of a Blaine 
provision that prohibits states from funding religious schools.323 This 
decision might very well lead to new voucher litigation that results in 
other state high courts upholding voucher programs despite similar 
Blaine provisions.324 Given that these Blaine provisions exist in forty 
                                                     
315. See infra Section III.B. 
316. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
317. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
318. See infra Section III.B. 
319. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing sources with news 
coverage of the voucher debate following the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Meredith v. Pence).
321. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
322. See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1230-31 (Ind. 2013). 
323. See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
324. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 669 (“By offering a new slant on 
interpreting state education clauses and rejecting all challenges to the Indiana 
voucher program, the Indiana high court has provided encouragement to school 
privatization proponents that this ruling could become a prototype for other state 
court decisions. If this happens, it could signal a new wave of state litigation with 
outcomes more favorable to voucher programs.” (footnote omitted)). 
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out of fifty state constitutions,325 the likelihood that other state courts 
may uphold school voucher programs despite these Blaine provisions 
may have an enormous impact on the amount of students able to 
receive state funds for private-school education.326 For instance, 
following Meredith, the number of Indiana voucher recipients 
doubled.327 Additionally, enrollment in voucher programs has 
increased each year, with record numbers of enrollment for the 
2013–2014 school year.328 It is then especially troubling that special 
education voucher programs may increase and survive constitutional 
challenges when little to no state accountability measures exist in the 
state statutes that authorize these programs.329 States currently 
expend over $275 million each year on special education voucher 
programs330 and yet have no way to ensure that students with 
disabilities who receive vouchers actually benefit from the 
instruction received at those institutions due to the paucity of 
required accountability measures.331
Predictions regarding the future creation and expansion of 
voucher programs certainly have merit with respect to special 
education voucher programs.332 For instance, Wisconsin recently 
proposed a new special education voucher program,333 and Florida 
recently passed a bill on June 20, 2014, to expand funding for special 
                                                     
325. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
326. See Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School 
Choice, and Charitable Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 99 (2005) (emphasizing 
that there is an “array of judicial options for circumventing, invalidating, or even 
ignoring state no-funding provisions”); Buck, supra note 71, at 655-56 (“Whether 
other states that have similar ‘Blaine amendments[]’ . . . will interpret them as 
restrictively as Arizona or whether they will still permit vouchers to be used at 
religiously affiliated schools is not yet known.”).
327. See Stephanie Wang, Indiana Voucher Students Double to Nearly 
20,000, INDYSTAR (Jan. 27, 2014, 11:38 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/ 
news/politics/2014/01/27/indiana-voucher-students-double-to-nearly-20000/
4939801/. 
328. See Devos, supra note 47 (“The [2013–2014] school year produced the 
largest single year increase in school choice enrollment nationwide.”).
329. See supra Part II. 
330. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also FRENDEWEY ET AL.,
supra note 49, at 15 (charting the amount of state funds expended every year on 
each of the ten special education voucher programs). 
331. See supra Part II. 
332. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 669 (predicting the likelihood of more 
voucher-favorable outcomes). 
333. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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education vouchers.334 The new bill provided an additional $18 
million for these programs.335 At the eleventh hour, legislators added 
special education provisions to the general education voucher bill, 
prompting criticism from teachers’ organizations from around the 
state.336 This kind of last-minute expansion of special education 
voucher programs is dangerous for students with disabilities who 
enroll in these programs, especially if the proposed expansion 
contains no provisions that ensure accountability.337 Notably, this 
new special education voucher program does not require teachers at 
participating private schools to hold a teaching certificate, let alone a 
degree in education or special education.338 Furthermore, there is no 
requirement that the participating private school report student 
progress to the state.339 Thus, requiring that states implement these 
two objective accountability measures now would work toward 
ensuring that the increasing number of students with disabilities who 
enroll in these programs each year benefit from the instruction they 
receive and that these programs are worth the $275 million expended 
each year.340
B. Requiring Specific Accountability Measures for Participating 
Private Schools 
The majority of special education voucher programs lack two 
very basic accountability measures: the requirement that 
participating private schools retain teachers with special education 
credentials and the requirement that these schools provide the state 
with reports of students’ progress.341 Given the highly influential 
                                                     
334. See McGrory, supra note 13 (“The bill . . . let[s] the parents of special-
needs children access state funding for private-school tuition, tutoring, educational 
materials[,] and various types of therapies.”).
335. See id.
336. See McGrory, supra note 14 (stating that “with two days left in the 
legislative session, lawmakers [added the special education provisions] . . . a move 
the Florida Education Association later called ‘sneaky’”).
337. See Strauss, supra note 11. 
338. See id. (“Voucher school teachers do not have to have a degree in 
education. In fact, they don’t even have to have a teaching certificate.”).
339. See id. (“The legislation doesn’t require that voucher schools explain 
how the money they get from the scholarships is spent or how students progress.”).
340. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra Part II. 
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Meredith v. Pence decision342 and the increase in proposals for 
special education voucher programs,343 mandating accountability for 
these future programs is essential to ensure that students with 
disabilities receive the necessary education and that the state 
government spends its funds effectively.344 This is especially true 
given that an increase in these programs would divert even more 
funds away from the public-school system.345 Therefore, states that 
propose legislation to introduce or expand special education school 
voucher laws must be held accountable to ensure that use of the 
state’s funding for these programs objectively benefits the 
individualized needs of students with disabilities.346 A proposed 
solution to this lack of accountability would require that any newly 
proposed legislation providing state funding to private schools for 
special education vouchers include specific accountability 
measures.347 At the very least, those private schools wishing to 
participate in special education voucher programs must (1) retain 
certified special education instructors;348 and (2) provide annual 
individualized assessments of student progress administered by those 
certified special education instructors to both the students’ parents 
and to the state.349 Only by adopting these two accountability 
measures will states ensure that students with disabilities receive a 
quality education and that state educational funds are spent wisely.350
                                                     
342. See supra Subsection I.C.4 (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
Indiana Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the school voucher program and 
foreshadowing the effect this decision may have on future voucher litigation). 
343. See supra Section III.A. 
344. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2.
345. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 670-71 (“If the majority of the states 
adopt large-scale voucher programs to fund education and courts follow the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s lead in endorsing such programs, this could launch a new chapter 
in the voucher narrative. The movement to privatize education shows no signs of 
slowing, and voucher and tax credit proposals are currently being discussed in a 
majority of the states. Assuming that 60% of the state’s student population could 
take advantage of private education under Indiana’s voucher program, the threat to 
public schools is very real.” (footnote omitted)). 
346. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2 (proposing two mandatory 
accountability measures for private schools that participate in special education 
voucher programs). 
347. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2.
348. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
349. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
350. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2.
1168 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1125 
1. Participating Private Schools Must Retain Certified Special 
Education Instructors  
One solution to the accountability problem is to ensure that the 
educators who will be responsible for teaching voucher recipients are 
certified special education instructors.351 Only four of the existing ten 
special education voucher programs require that teachers hold 
special education credentials.352 States spend millions of dollars each 
year on these special education voucher programs,353 but the majority 
of existing programs do not even require that the participating 
private school have a single teacher with special education 
credentials on staff.354 In fact, four state statutes that authorize these 
programs only require that the teacher have a mere three years of 
teaching experience,355 and even this is exempted if the teacher has 
“skills, knowledge, or expertise,”356 or “experience in education or 
health,” though the statutes fail to define exactly what type of 
proficiency is required.357 No required teacher qualifications exist at 
all for one program.358 This could lead to dire consequences for 
special education voucher recipients because, according to the broad 
statutory language, any number of persons could meet these meager 
                                                     
351. The majority of special education voucher programs do not require that 
instructors have degrees or training in teaching students with disabilities. See supra
Sections II.B-C.
352. The four special education voucher programs that require teachers to 
hold special education credentials are: The Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy 
Scholarship for Students with Dyslexia Program, the Mississippi Speech-Language 
Therapy Scholarship for Students with Speech-Language Impairments Program, 
Louisiana’s School Choice Program for Certain Students with Exceptionalities, and 
Ohio’s Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program. See supra Sections II.B-C.
353. See supra Part II (outlining the ten existing special education voucher 
programs and the amount each respective state expended on each voucher program 
during the 2013–2014 school year); see also FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15 
(charting the amount of state funds expended by each of the ten special education 
voucher programs in the 2013–2014 school year). 
354. See supra Part II. 
355. FLA. STAT. § 1002.421(2)(h) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2115(a)(7) 
(2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101.2(H)(6) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-
705(1)(g)(ii) (West 2014). 
356. FLA. STAT. § 1002.421(2)(h); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 13-101.2(H)(6); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-705(1)(g)(iii). 
357. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2115(a)(7). 
358. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-112.9 (2014) (requiring that parents receive 
reports of student progress, but containing no requirements for teacher certifications 
or qualifications). 
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qualifications despite having little to no practical training in teaching 
students with disabilities.359
Additionally, parents of students with disabilities may not be 
aware that these private schools have low standards for instructors as 
compared to their public-school counterparts or that they waive their 
child’s rights under the IDEA by enrolling their child in a voucher 
program at a private school.360 Non-voucher educational programs 
require that their educators are “highly qualified,”361 which means 
that these instructors must have a bachelor’s degree and either 
complete the state’s special education licensing exam or become 
fully certified as a special education instructor.362 These 
qualifications stand in sharp contrast to the undefined “skills”
required of educators under most special education voucher 
programs.363 Furthermore, the implementation of the IDEA and the 
requirement of “highly qualified” special education instructors 
“implicitly recognize[s] that special education cannot be appropriate 
without qualified teachers and other qualified personnel.”364 Thus, the 
lack of a requirement for “highly qualified” special education 
instructors at participating private schools means that state money is 
spent to fund private schools with subpar educational programs for 
students with disabilities.365
Moreover, since parents are not informed that these voucher 
programs do not have such requirements for participating private 
schools, it seems that the “parental choice” benefits that voucher 
proponents and courts hold in such high regard are not very 
                                                     
359. See Hensel, supra note 248, at 329 (“Neither the statute nor the 
Department of Education indicates what ‘special skills’ might qualify under this 
provision, opening the door to potentially wide-ranging qualifications.”).
360. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
361. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(D) (2012) (“[A] State shall adopt a policy that 
includes a requirement that local educational agencies in the State take measurable 
steps to recruit, hire, train, and retain highly qualified personnel to provide special 
education and related services under this subchapter to children with disabilities.”).
362. Id. § 7801(23) (defining “highly qualified” with respect to primary and 
secondary instructors). 
363. See supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text (listing the state statutes 
that merely require an instructor at a private school participating in the voucher 
program to have “skills” or “experience” instead of degrees or training in educating 
students with disabilities). 
364. J. Matt Jameson & Dixie S. Huefner, “Highly Qualified” Special 
Educators and the Provision of a Free and Appropriate Public Education to 
Students with Disabilities, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 32 (2006). 
365. See supra Part II. 
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trustworthy.366 Parents may not realize that enrolling their student 
with disabilities in a private school through the voucher program 
means that they have forfeited their child’s rights under the IDEA367
and instead have placed their child in a private school that does not 
even require a single special education instructor to be on staff.368
Furthermore, many parents unwittingly make uninformed choices 
due to the lack of information that participating private schools 
provide for parents and the inability for parents to receive this 
information even when they do ask for it.369 The surveys of parents 
who enrolled their students in the McKay Scholarship Program show 
that half of the parents were not able to obtain information about the 
program even after asking for this information.370 Moreover, 77% of 
private schools participating in the McKay Scholarship Program did 
not even have a special education program.371 These surveys indicate 
that parental choice, an aspect that voucher proponents tout as the 
defining justification for these programs372 and that courts use to 
justify Establishment Clause issues,373 is an uninformed choice at 
best—and at worst a choice that places students in an environment 
that does not have any resources for students with disabilities.374
Given that the majority of special education voucher programs 
may not actually have any special education instructors on staff, new 
programs should require that private schools wishing to participate in 
a voucher program prove that the teachers who will educate the 
                                                     
366. See supra Section I.C (showing that both federal and state courts have 
upheld voucher programs based on the “parental choice” rationale).
367. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
368. See supra Section II.A. 
369. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 323 (“Although parental choice is often 
highlighted as a strength of voucher programs, the information necessary [to] make 
informed choices is often lacking.”).
370. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
371. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 323 (“One study in Florida, for example, 
found that 77% of the schools accepting McKay students provided no special 
program of any kind for disabled students.”).
372. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“parental choice” rationale that courts utilize to justify upholding the legality of 
school voucher programs when faced with challenges that these programs violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
374. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 323 (“There is evidence to suggest . . . that 
the majority of children accepting special needs vouchers attend private schools with 
little or no differentiated programming. One study in Florida, for example, found 
that 77% of the schools accepting McKay students provided no special program of 
any kind for disabled students.”).
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voucher recipients are certified special education instructors.375
Therefore, new programs should follow Louisiana’s lead in this 
respect and require that educators in participating private schools 
hold the same certification requirements as those teachers who 
educate students with disabilities in non-voucher settings.376 In 
modeling the requirements for special education instructors at 
participating private schools after the requirements for instructors in 
non-voucher programs, the state can accomplish the goals of 
ensuring that students receive a quality education and that the state 
spends its money in a beneficial way.377
2. Participating Private Schools Must Conduct Annual Student 
Assessments and Report Student Progress to the State 
In addition to the lack of special education credentials for 
teachers of voucher recipients,378 the majority of special education 
voucher programs also do not require that private schools report 
student progress to the state.379 States could be spending millions of 
dollars380 on ineffective programs, but have no way to know this 
because eight out of the ten existing programs do not require that the 
state receive reports on students’ progress.381 While many programs 
require that the private schools provide annual progress reports to 
parents, there is no similar requirement that the schools send those 
progress reports to the state.382 The two Ohio programs constitute the 
only special education voucher programs that report student progress 
to both the student’s parents as well as to the state.383
Therefore, one way to solve this problem is to follow Ohio’s
lead in providing annual individualized educational assessments of 
student progress administered by the certified special education 
                                                     
375. See supra Part II. 
376. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (outlining Louisiana’s 
requirement that instructors in participating private schools hold the same 
credentials as instructors in non-voucher settings). 
377. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra Section II.A (categorizing the special education voucher 
programs that do not require instructors to hold special education credentials). 
379. See supra Sections II.A-B.
380. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that total amount of 
money expended in the 2013–2014 school year was $275 million). 
381. See supra Part II. 
382. See supra Part II. 
383. See supra Subsections II.C.2-3.
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instructors to the state.384 Ohio’s Jon Peterson Special Needs 
Scholarship Program is currently the only special education voucher 
program that requires administration of state assessments conducted 
by the student’s IEP team.385 New programs should adopt Ohio’s
framework in this respect by also requiring that the student’s IEP 
team annually conduct an assessment of the student’s progress.386
This way, if a student is not succeeding in the program, then the 
student does not spend additional years and state funds in a program 
that does not work for that student.387 The student’s IEP team would 
have the ability to monitor the student’s annual progress and counsel 
the student depending on the student’s assessment results.388  
Following Ohio’s lead, the state should also review the 
collective assessment results from the participating schools each 
year: If the state determines based on these annual assessments that a 
private school is not providing the requisite services to students with 
disabilities, then the state may have to reevaluate the amount of 
money spent on these programs.389 Both voucher supporters and 
opponents can likely agree that it is undesirable for students with 
disabilities to receive a subpar education, and it is equally 
undesirable for states to waste millions of dollars on potentially 
ineffective programs.390 Therefore, if private schools wish to 
participate in the voucher program and receive state funding during a 
public-school funding crisis, then these schools must objectively 
show that the funding is benefiting the student by reporting student 
assessment data to the state.391
                                                     
384. See supra notes 293, 302 and accompanying text. 
385. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.522 (West 2014). 
386. Id. § 3310.58(G) (“The school or entity agrees to provide a record of the 
implementation of the individualized education program for each qualified special 
education child enrolled in the school’s or entity’s special education program, 
including evaluation of the child’s progress, to the school district in which the child 
is entitled to attend school, in the form and manner prescribed by the department.”).
387. See supra Subsections II.C.2-3.
388. The Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program requires that each 
student’s IEP team review the student’s progress on an annual basis and report that 
progress to the state. See supra Subsections II.C.2-3.
389. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
391. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing sources that 
emphasize the lack of educational funding assistance for public schools). 
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C. The Importance of Implementing More Stringent Accountability 
Measures 
While some critics may have reservations about implementing 
more stringent accountability measures, the importance of requiring 
accountability measures outweighs these concerns.392 The first 
criticism of this approach is the assertion that more stringent 
requirements attached to these voucher programs would impede the 
goal of expanding the availability of special education voucher 
programs.393 Critics may argue that, in setting more difficult 
standards for participating private schools, fewer schools are likely 
to meet the qualifications for participation in the programs,394 which 
would consequently render these voucher programs less available for 
students with disabilities.395 However, each Ohio program effectively 
provided vouchers to over 2,000 students in the 2013–2014 school 
year for each voucher program while also requiring that private 
schools receive annual records of student progress,396 and this 
number continues to increase each year despite these more stringent 
accountability requirements.397 Student enrollment in the recently 
enacted Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program increased 
by over 300 students,398 and student enrollment in the Autism 
Scholarship Program increased by over 2,300 students since its 
inception in 2003.399 Furthermore, these programs should not, in fact, 
be expanded—and more funds dispensed to participating private
                                                     
392. See infra notes 393, 402, 407 and accompanying text (outlining three 
anticipated criticisms to implementing more stringent accountability requirements). 
393. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 42 (“It might be best, however, 
not to require state accountability testing in a special education voucher program.”).
394. See Arianna Prothero, Why Private Schools Are Opting Out of Voucher 
Programs, EDUC. WK. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2015, 1:47 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/ 
edweek/charterschoice/2015/01/why_private_schools_are_opting_out_of_voucher_ 
programs.html (stating that “[c]oncerns about too much regulation and maintaining 
independence are the primary reasons private schools choose not to participate in 
school voucher or tax-credit scholarship programs”).
395. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 42-43.
396. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 15 (showing that 2,623 
students received vouchers in Ohio’s Autism Scholarship Program and that 2,103 
students received vouchers in Ohio’s Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship 
Program in the 2013–2014 school year). 
397. See id. at 79, 81 (providing charts for each of the two special education 
voucher programs that show growth in these programs since their respective 
inaugural years).  
398. See id. at 81. 
399. See id. at 79. 
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schools during a public-school funding crisis—if private schools are 
not held accountable and do not provide objective evidence of the 
program’s success.400 If states adopt the proposed basic 
accountability measures of teacher certification and reporting student 
assessment to the state, then states will be able to take the 
appropriate remedial steps when participating private schools fall 
short of these standards, thus ensuring that students with disabilities 
receive proper instruction and that the state allocates its money to 
effective programs.401
Another criticism is that states would be less flexible in their 
ability to provide services for students with disabilities.402 Critics 
may argue that increased regulation of instructors may deter some 
unqualified but otherwise excellent educators from providing unique 
services to individual students with disabilities.403 This, in turn, 
would create fewer opportunities for students with disabilities, a 
group of individuals who would benefit from increased flexibility in 
educational options.404 However, there is a real danger that programs 
with no accountability or objective assessments may actually harm 
students with disabilities by failing to ensure that these students 
receive the individualized attention they need, and therefore these 
private-school services would be undesirable.405 Requiring that 
schools retain certified special education teachers on staff can only 
serve to benefit these programs and the students they aid because all 
instructors would then possess the necessary skills to meet the 
individualized needs of each student participating in the voucher 
program.406
                                                     
400. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that $275 million was 
expended in the 2013–2014 school year and that funds spent on vouchers increase 
each year). 
401. See supra Section III.B. 
402. See Hensel, supra note 81, at 326. 
403. See id. (conceding that “there undoubtedly are some individuals who 
would not meet the federal standards but who nevertheless may be exemplary 
teachers”).
404. See Greene & Buck, supra note 52, at 39 (arguing that increased 
opportunities for students with disabilities through voucher programs are critical 
because these programs “give parents the right to select a private placement without 
having to convince public school officials of the need for such services”).
405. See Dwyer, supra note 200, at 394-95. 
406. See Jameson & Huefner, supra note 364, at 32 (asserting that “the 
IDEA regulations . . . implicitly recognize that special education cannot be 
appropriate without qualified teachers and other qualified personnel to provide 
related services”).
 Accountability in Special Education Voucher Programs 1175 
Finally, some critics may argue that it is too difficult to provide 
objective measurements of progress for students with disabilities 
because every student requires a unique educational experience.407
One way in which to solve this issue is to have the required special 
education instructors at the private school evaluate each individual 
student based on the student’s individual goals implemented by the 
student’s IEP team, thus modeling accountability measures from the 
existing framework successfully used in non-voucher programs.408
This data on student progress should then be shared with the state in 
order to determine whether or not the participating private school has 
implemented an effective program.409
The undeniable future expansion of special education voucher 
programs necessitates accountability: Not only are these programs 
here to stay, but proposals for the creation of new programs and for 
the expansion of existing programs also continue to rise.410 The 
recent Meredith v. Pence decision and the subsequent increase in 
proposals for special education voucher programs411 illustrate that 
these programs will continue to rise in both the number of available 
programs and in the number of students with disabilities who will 
exercise the option to attend private schools through state funding.412
Therefore, participating private schools must be held accountable in 
order to guarantee that the increasing number of students with 
disabilities served through these programs receive the requisite 
services and that the millions of state dollars expended actually 
finance effective programs.413 Two basic accountability measures that 
all newly proposed special education voucher programs should 
implement include the requirement that participating private schools 
retain certified special education instructors414 and that the schools 
provide annual reports of student progress to the state.415 This will 
                                                     
407. See supra Section I.B. 
408. See supra Subsection III.B.2 (proposing that states with special 
education voucher programs require that the private schools participating in these 
programs conduct annual student assessments and report student progress to the 
state). 
409. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
410. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 17 (charting the steady 
increase in the total number of students enrolled in voucher programs from the 
2000–2001 school year to the 2013–2014 school year). 
411. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
412. See FRENDEWEY ET AL., supra note 49, at 17. 
413. See supra Part III. 
414. See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
415. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
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allow states to monitor the effectiveness of the programs and 
subsequently make well-informed future decisions as to the 
expenditure of limited state funds and the implementation of new 
programs that benefit the individualized needs of students with 
disabilities.416
CONCLUSION
Given the lack of sufficient funding for public schools417 and 
the increase in proposals for state-funded special education voucher 
programs following the Meredith v. Pence decision,418 states that 
wish to expand special education voucher laws must be held 
accountable to ensure that use of the state’s funding for these 
programs objectively benefits the individualized educational needs of 
students with disabilities while also ensuring that state dollars are 
used wisely.419 Since lack of private-school accountability remains 
one of the most heavily criticized features of these special education 
voucher programs,420 newly proposed legislation for the creation or 
expansion of special education voucher programs should require that 
private schools meet specific participation standards.421 Participating 
private schools must (1) retain certified special education 
instructors;422 and (2) provide annual individualized assessments of 
student progress administered by these certified special education 
instructors to both the students’ parents and to the state.423
These proposed mandatory participation standards offer 
practical ways in which states can increase accountability in order to 
serve the policy goals of ensuring that students with disabilities 
receive a proper education and ensuring that state funds finance 
effective programs.424 Unless each state mandates more stringent 
accountability measures to address the shortcomings of these 
programs, the unimpeded expansion of these voucher programs will 
be detrimental to both the students with disabilities who attend these 
ineffective programs as well as states that provide funding for these 
                                                     
416. See supra Section III.B. 
417. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
418. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
419. See supra Section III.B. 
420. See supra Section I.A. 
421. See supra Part III. 
422. See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
423. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
424. See supra Part III. 
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programs.425 States currently proposing new special education 
voucher programs or proposing the expansion of existing programs 
must enact these proposed accountability measures now to prevent 
students with disabilities from receiving a subpar education and to 
prevent states from funding ineffective educational programs during 
a public-school funding crisis.426
                                                     
425. See supra Part III. 
426. See supra Part III. 

